There are some strong assumptions about the metaphysics of persons in these sorts of arguments, which I don't think I share, and make the formulation of the premises confusing. When I read EI, I hear something parallel to this:
"A Lego structure's differential between blue and yellow Lego blocks cannot be compared between an outcome in which the structure exists and one in which it does not."
Which is fine, I guess. I'm not sure whether I ought to treat it as an issue of metaphysics or of linguistic convention. But if we have a goal to increase blue Legos and decrease yellow Legos in the structure space on the dining room table, then our acceptance or rejection of such a premise has no bearing on our ability to compare the situation in which Tommy builds an all-blue structure with the situation in which he goes and watches TV instead: the former is better with respect to our goal.
Why do you start off assuming that you can’t harm someone who doesn’t exist? That is not at all clear, and perhaps not coherent. whenever we cause anything we cause things in the future. If we do something and it causes harm to someone in the future, we harm them. Any other conclusion is not really consistent with modern concepts of space and time.
"imagine watching the “movie reel” of Joy’s potential life unfold before your eyes, and feeling nothing."
I feel for Joy, just like we feel for characters of movies when we engage our imagination. But there's a gap between such feeling during imagination and thinking you have a reason to bring someone (Joy or the movie character) into existence. You conflate that gap. Insults are not arguments.
Hey Richard, I created my substack again. I deleted my substack because of my OCD and anxiety issues. But I just thought I love and really really enjoy commenting and writing stuff sometimes. So, here I am. Anyways, again an excellent post! I think, I now firmly believe that Hedonistic Act Utilitarianism (Bentham, Sidgewick, Rosenqvist, Sinhababu, Hewitt Rawlette, not Mill) is true.
I think, the impersonal good is also necessarily "good for". So, bringing joy into existence is good because it maximizes pleasure and pleasure is the impersonal good and this means that it is necessarily good for joy. So, pleasure is good for joy precisely because pleasure is good simpliciter or pleasure just is good full stop. And all beings should have highest possible level of pleasure.
I think, pleasure fundamentalism is a respectable view.
I deeply love this - “The core precept of utilitarianism is that we should make the world the best place we can. That means that, as far as it is within our power, we should bring about a world in which every individual has the highest possible level of well-being.” — Peter Singer
Nonexistent persons cannot give consent. So we should treat them the same way we treat other entities that cannot consent: children, invalids, animals. Children have parents (natural or adoptive) or guardians. Invalids have next of kin or persons with power of attorney. Animals have owners.
In the case of unborn children, it seems unremarkable to have their prospective parents speak for them. Perhaps prospective parents are biased, but they pay for their errors. If the child suffers, so do the parents. Why should we take any other person's evaluation as more valid?
Doesn’t existence incomparativism rely on ethics being affecting when we should just be comparing worlds instead. Like what’s the argument against making right/wrong distinctions on the basis of basis of the world the comes from the action instead of how it affects someone?
There is logical space for a view that existence would not be worse for Misery but we should not create Misery. This is Ralf Bader’s view (who tries to defend the asymmetry) but also John Broome’s view (who does not). So it’s a bit misleading to end the Misery example by asking “Should you press the button?” when what you seem mostly interested in are existential harms/benefits.
To believe both that pressing a button to prevent Joy's existence would be morally wrong, and that pressing a button to create Joy's existence would not be morally right, it seems like one would have to assign massive moral significance to the polarity by which a finger physically contacting a button toggles exactly the same two world states. Which is bonkers.
There are some strong assumptions about the metaphysics of persons in these sorts of arguments, which I don't think I share, and make the formulation of the premises confusing. When I read EI, I hear something parallel to this:
"A Lego structure's differential between blue and yellow Lego blocks cannot be compared between an outcome in which the structure exists and one in which it does not."
Which is fine, I guess. I'm not sure whether I ought to treat it as an issue of metaphysics or of linguistic convention. But if we have a goal to increase blue Legos and decrease yellow Legos in the structure space on the dining room table, then our acceptance or rejection of such a premise has no bearing on our ability to compare the situation in which Tommy builds an all-blue structure with the situation in which he goes and watches TV instead: the former is better with respect to our goal.
Why do you start off assuming that you can’t harm someone who doesn’t exist? That is not at all clear, and perhaps not coherent. whenever we cause anything we cause things in the future. If we do something and it causes harm to someone in the future, we harm them. Any other conclusion is not really consistent with modern concepts of space and time.
Existence Incomparativism seems obviously false.
"imagine watching the “movie reel” of Joy’s potential life unfold before your eyes, and feeling nothing."
I feel for Joy, just like we feel for characters of movies when we engage our imagination. But there's a gap between such feeling during imagination and thinking you have a reason to bring someone (Joy or the movie character) into existence. You conflate that gap. Insults are not arguments.
Hey Richard, I created my substack again. I deleted my substack because of my OCD and anxiety issues. But I just thought I love and really really enjoy commenting and writing stuff sometimes. So, here I am. Anyways, again an excellent post! I think, I now firmly believe that Hedonistic Act Utilitarianism (Bentham, Sidgewick, Rosenqvist, Sinhababu, Hewitt Rawlette, not Mill) is true.
https://philpapers.org/archive/ROSHAU.pdf
I think, the impersonal good is also necessarily "good for". So, bringing joy into existence is good because it maximizes pleasure and pleasure is the impersonal good and this means that it is necessarily good for joy. So, pleasure is good for joy precisely because pleasure is good simpliciter or pleasure just is good full stop. And all beings should have highest possible level of pleasure.
I think, pleasure fundamentalism is a respectable view.
I deeply love this - “The core precept of utilitarianism is that we should make the world the best place we can. That means that, as far as it is within our power, we should bring about a world in which every individual has the highest possible level of well-being.” — Peter Singer
Nonexistent persons cannot give consent. So we should treat them the same way we treat other entities that cannot consent: children, invalids, animals. Children have parents (natural or adoptive) or guardians. Invalids have next of kin or persons with power of attorney. Animals have owners.
In the case of unborn children, it seems unremarkable to have their prospective parents speak for them. Perhaps prospective parents are biased, but they pay for their errors. If the child suffers, so do the parents. Why should we take any other person's evaluation as more valid?
Doesn’t existence incomparativism rely on ethics being affecting when we should just be comparing worlds instead. Like what’s the argument against making right/wrong distinctions on the basis of basis of the world the comes from the action instead of how it affects someone?
There is logical space for a view that existence would not be worse for Misery but we should not create Misery. This is Ralf Bader’s view (who tries to defend the asymmetry) but also John Broome’s view (who does not). So it’s a bit misleading to end the Misery example by asking “Should you press the button?” when what you seem mostly interested in are existential harms/benefits.
To believe both that pressing a button to prevent Joy's existence would be morally wrong, and that pressing a button to create Joy's existence would not be morally right, it seems like one would have to assign massive moral significance to the polarity by which a finger physically contacting a button toggles exactly the same two world states. Which is bonkers.