Here’s a plausible principle: the prior probability of some set of initial conditions doesn’t depend on the higher order properties of it. For instance, things following the shroedinger equation aren’t more likely simply because they’ll result in complex things. But if this is true, then your solution runs into troubles -- the likelihood of psychophysical laws can’t have anything to do with whether they cause humans with accurate beliefs.
An interesting response from Brian Cutter on the public FB thread: https://www.facebook.com/richard.chappell/posts/pfbid0r8rNLkNHF6dq61VHyZsaURXSULRNMJNtDPKBiJggEXT2Da9NDyUPccUUdQhQGnpkl?comment_id=278901985045766
Here’s a plausible principle: the prior probability of some set of initial conditions doesn’t depend on the higher order properties of it. For instance, things following the shroedinger equation aren’t more likely simply because they’ll result in complex things. But if this is true, then your solution runs into troubles -- the likelihood of psychophysical laws can’t have anything to do with whether they cause humans with accurate beliefs.