Dec 28, 2022·edited Dec 28, 2022Liked by Richard Y Chappell
"[T]he idea that utilitarianism is “counterintuitive” rests on interpreting it as addressing a primitive, indefinable sense of ‘wrongness’."
That might be one thing that makes utilitarianism look unintuitive, but there are lots of others. For example, its lack of sensitivity to how "close" someone is to you (e.g. your mom) is unintuitive in some ways especially in particular cases (if not at the level principles).
Lack of sensitivity to lots of other ethical ideas (see next sentence) also make it conflict strongly with a lot of intuitions we have in our lives. Such ideas include, desert, reciprocity, loyalty, non-betrayal, local egalitarianism, responsibility, honesty, sadistic pleasures, human supremacy, the importance of pre-existing value, authenticity, integrity. These ideas may sometimes seem unintuitive at the level of principles (debatable), but I think they are often highly unintuitive in real cases.
You can argue that these intuitions are outweighed by other ones, explained away, or sacrificed in the quest for a fully specified and parsimonious theory, but they do exist. And I don't see why a theory that accounted for these things couldn't adopt scalarism or whatever alternative to binary-deontic fundamentalism you suggest.
I don't follow this: "Imagine that a killer asteroid is heading straight for Earth. With sufficient effort and ingenuity, humanity could work to deflect it. But no-one bothers. Everybody dies. This is clearly not a great outcome, even if no-one has done anything morally wrong (since no-one has done anything at all). This scenario poses a challenge to the adequacy of traditional morality, with its focus on moral prohibitions, or “thou shalt nots”. "
What is the challenge? Plainly it's impermissible to ignore the child drowning in the pond (/to do nothing while the child drowns in the pond—if you're reifying the idea of "doing nothing"). And plainly it's also impermissible to ignore an asteroid flying towards the planet if you're in a position to stop the collision. (One reason to be sceptical of giving weight to this idea of "doing nothing" is that it's very hard to cash out in a sensible way. Does napping count? Standing still? Ignoring someone? Trying hard to ignore someone? Etc. etc.) Unless I'm missing something, I don't see why this would be a challenge for anyone—deontologists included.
I’ve struggled in the past to say why I find permissibility an unintuitive framing, so thanks for addressing this subject! The asteroid is a good example of a situation where there’s no way to set up permissibility rules that feel intuitive.
Seems to me your argument in “Importance is more important (authoritative)” will miss the point for most people. If I'm understanding right, your argument would be persuasive to a demographic with the intuitions that (1) the reasons to save five are more important than the reasons to avoid wrong, but (2) we should prioritize wrongness-type reasons, even when they’re less important than other reasons. It’s hard for me to imagine people holding the second intuition. Surely most disagreements happen over the first intuition (which reasons are more important)?
To what extent do your arguments here depend on some form of metaethical realism/objectivism regarding "importance"/"what matters"/"what is ultimately worth caring about"?
If there is no (knowable) fact of the matter concerning "what is ultimately worth caring about," but only facts such as "what I do care about" and "what I can reasonably expect others to care about," then certain non-consequentialist ideas (e.g. agent-relativity, supererogation) become much more plausible.
In particular, I would regard impermissibilty and supererogation, which you here treat with suspicion as signs of moral laxity, as intiuitively familiar and potentially useful concepts for mapping the treacherous moral terrain between the regions of what I care about, what I can reasonably expect others to care about, and what others can reasonably expect me to care about.
'Imagine that a killer asteroid is heading straight for Earth. With sufficient effort and ingenuity, humanity could work to deflect it. But no-one bothers. Everybody dies"
Big picture stuff like wars.and catastrophes typically isn't among the obligations of ordinary citizens ...but it is for governments and the like. Consider the aftermath of 9/11, when security agencies were criticised for failing, but ordinary people on the ground were praised to the skies.for their help.
1. That's very easy to fix...you just add praise/rewards for superogatory goodness to punishments for underperformance. Of course, everything works like that already.
2. Needing elements of deontology isn't exclusive of needing elements of consequentialism etc. Rule consequentialism is an example of a combined approach. Likewise, arguments for consequentialism aren't per se arguments.agaisnt deontology. The arguments for deontology stand up in their own right. Deontology ensures that the bare minimum actually happens, enhances coordination, and creates clarity about when punishments will descend.
3. People seem to have intuitions to some.extent in favour of all of C, D and V, so it is likely that all one legged approaches are counterintuitive.
"[T]he idea that utilitarianism is “counterintuitive” rests on interpreting it as addressing a primitive, indefinable sense of ‘wrongness’."
That might be one thing that makes utilitarianism look unintuitive, but there are lots of others. For example, its lack of sensitivity to how "close" someone is to you (e.g. your mom) is unintuitive in some ways especially in particular cases (if not at the level principles).
Lack of sensitivity to lots of other ethical ideas (see next sentence) also make it conflict strongly with a lot of intuitions we have in our lives. Such ideas include, desert, reciprocity, loyalty, non-betrayal, local egalitarianism, responsibility, honesty, sadistic pleasures, human supremacy, the importance of pre-existing value, authenticity, integrity. These ideas may sometimes seem unintuitive at the level of principles (debatable), but I think they are often highly unintuitive in real cases.
You can argue that these intuitions are outweighed by other ones, explained away, or sacrificed in the quest for a fully specified and parsimonious theory, but they do exist. And I don't see why a theory that accounted for these things couldn't adopt scalarism or whatever alternative to binary-deontic fundamentalism you suggest.
I don't follow this: "Imagine that a killer asteroid is heading straight for Earth. With sufficient effort and ingenuity, humanity could work to deflect it. But no-one bothers. Everybody dies. This is clearly not a great outcome, even if no-one has done anything morally wrong (since no-one has done anything at all). This scenario poses a challenge to the adequacy of traditional morality, with its focus on moral prohibitions, or “thou shalt nots”. "
What is the challenge? Plainly it's impermissible to ignore the child drowning in the pond (/to do nothing while the child drowns in the pond—if you're reifying the idea of "doing nothing"). And plainly it's also impermissible to ignore an asteroid flying towards the planet if you're in a position to stop the collision. (One reason to be sceptical of giving weight to this idea of "doing nothing" is that it's very hard to cash out in a sensible way. Does napping count? Standing still? Ignoring someone? Trying hard to ignore someone? Etc. etc.) Unless I'm missing something, I don't see why this would be a challenge for anyone—deontologists included.
I’ve struggled in the past to say why I find permissibility an unintuitive framing, so thanks for addressing this subject! The asteroid is a good example of a situation where there’s no way to set up permissibility rules that feel intuitive.
Seems to me your argument in “Importance is more important (authoritative)” will miss the point for most people. If I'm understanding right, your argument would be persuasive to a demographic with the intuitions that (1) the reasons to save five are more important than the reasons to avoid wrong, but (2) we should prioritize wrongness-type reasons, even when they’re less important than other reasons. It’s hard for me to imagine people holding the second intuition. Surely most disagreements happen over the first intuition (which reasons are more important)?
To what extent do your arguments here depend on some form of metaethical realism/objectivism regarding "importance"/"what matters"/"what is ultimately worth caring about"?
If there is no (knowable) fact of the matter concerning "what is ultimately worth caring about," but only facts such as "what I do care about" and "what I can reasonably expect others to care about," then certain non-consequentialist ideas (e.g. agent-relativity, supererogation) become much more plausible.
In particular, I would regard impermissibilty and supererogation, which you here treat with suspicion as signs of moral laxity, as intiuitively familiar and potentially useful concepts for mapping the treacherous moral terrain between the regions of what I care about, what I can reasonably expect others to care about, and what others can reasonably expect me to care about.
'Imagine that a killer asteroid is heading straight for Earth. With sufficient effort and ingenuity, humanity could work to deflect it. But no-one bothers. Everybody dies"
Big picture stuff like wars.and catastrophes typically isn't among the obligations of ordinary citizens ...but it is for governments and the like. Consider the aftermath of 9/11, when security agencies were criticised for failing, but ordinary people on the ground were praised to the skies.for their help.
1. That's very easy to fix...you just add praise/rewards for superogatory goodness to punishments for underperformance. Of course, everything works like that already.
2. Needing elements of deontology isn't exclusive of needing elements of consequentialism etc. Rule consequentialism is an example of a combined approach. Likewise, arguments for consequentialism aren't per se arguments.agaisnt deontology. The arguments for deontology stand up in their own right. Deontology ensures that the bare minimum actually happens, enhances coordination, and creates clarity about when punishments will descend.
3. People seem to have intuitions to some.extent in favour of all of C, D and V, so it is likely that all one legged approaches are counterintuitive.