I appreciate what you are trying to do here. We don't want to say that any valid arguments is question-begging because its conclusion is contained in the conjunction of its premises. But I wonder if the criteria you suggest to distinguish question-begging from non-question-begging arguments makes it too easy to avoid the charge. I mean, if the mere possibility that someone might be swayed by the argument is sufficient to avoid the charge, that is a very low standard. And if the argument in question is for the most part dialectically useless because most people who antecedently rejected the conclusion have no inclination to accept a key premise, is the mere fact that we can find an accountant in Cleveland who is swayed by the argument that significant? Shouldn't the arguer, who is after all affirming their conclusion on the basis of their premises, still recognize that they have failed to make their case and that they have, at least in relation to their opponents, begged the question? Maybe you would say that in such a case, the arguer is assuming too much but has not begged the question. That's fine, I guess. I don't want to get into a mere verbal dispute (there are too many of those in Philosophy). But if we define "begging the question" narrowly, we may need to be careful to fill out our taxonomy of argumentative vices to include so many arguments that are flawed in ways that tend to be characterized as begging the question. I could mention many examples, but I don't want to pick on anyone.
I think discussions of question-begging are often hampered by a focus on deductive logic rather than bayesian reasoning. We should take into account the independent (im)plausibility of both premises and conclusions, and use deductive relations to update our prior credences into posteriors.
Admittedly, this gets complicated due to our vast, interconnected web of beliefs, but still.
I don't feel that this is persuasive because it hinges on a subjective sense how bad a premise is. If you're going to make that concession then you might as well use the conventional definition of question begging but adopt the norm that a reader asserting "question begging" reflects a difference in the writer and reader's belief in the plausibility of the premises. From this perspective, there is no great need to assert a distinction between contestability and Q-begging - although you could do so to reflect the difference in the intensity of beliefs of writer and the reader. I interpret you as saying Q-begging should reflect a "big" gap in plausibility while contestability should reflect a small gap, but who will respect that norm? Also, is there any conceptual history here to show that Q-begging's meaning has shifted over time? My impression was that it always referred to rejecting the premise and hinged on both parties being good faith.
"The conclusion [of a question-begging argument] is so transparently contained within the premises that there is no conceivably 'neglected' consideration there to highlight"
Of course, the conclusion of any valid argument must be logically deducible from its premises. In the understanding of this layman, an argument is question-begging if it takes a contestable premise (stated or unstated) for granted. What you're describing sounds more like what's commonly known as a "circular" argument: one in which the conclusion merely restates a premise in different terms.
I appreciate what you are trying to do here. We don't want to say that any valid arguments is question-begging because its conclusion is contained in the conjunction of its premises. But I wonder if the criteria you suggest to distinguish question-begging from non-question-begging arguments makes it too easy to avoid the charge. I mean, if the mere possibility that someone might be swayed by the argument is sufficient to avoid the charge, that is a very low standard. And if the argument in question is for the most part dialectically useless because most people who antecedently rejected the conclusion have no inclination to accept a key premise, is the mere fact that we can find an accountant in Cleveland who is swayed by the argument that significant? Shouldn't the arguer, who is after all affirming their conclusion on the basis of their premises, still recognize that they have failed to make their case and that they have, at least in relation to their opponents, begged the question? Maybe you would say that in such a case, the arguer is assuming too much but has not begged the question. That's fine, I guess. I don't want to get into a mere verbal dispute (there are too many of those in Philosophy). But if we define "begging the question" narrowly, we may need to be careful to fill out our taxonomy of argumentative vices to include so many arguments that are flawed in ways that tend to be characterized as begging the question. I could mention many examples, but I don't want to pick on anyone.
This essay begs the question in favour of the view that contestable arguments aren’t question begging.
I think discussions of question-begging are often hampered by a focus on deductive logic rather than bayesian reasoning. We should take into account the independent (im)plausibility of both premises and conclusions, and use deductive relations to update our prior credences into posteriors.
Admittedly, this gets complicated due to our vast, interconnected web of beliefs, but still.
I don't feel that this is persuasive because it hinges on a subjective sense how bad a premise is. If you're going to make that concession then you might as well use the conventional definition of question begging but adopt the norm that a reader asserting "question begging" reflects a difference in the writer and reader's belief in the plausibility of the premises. From this perspective, there is no great need to assert a distinction between contestability and Q-begging - although you could do so to reflect the difference in the intensity of beliefs of writer and the reader. I interpret you as saying Q-begging should reflect a "big" gap in plausibility while contestability should reflect a small gap, but who will respect that norm? Also, is there any conceptual history here to show that Q-begging's meaning has shifted over time? My impression was that it always referred to rejecting the premise and hinged on both parties being good faith.
"The conclusion [of a question-begging argument] is so transparently contained within the premises that there is no conceivably 'neglected' consideration there to highlight"
Of course, the conclusion of any valid argument must be logically deducible from its premises. In the understanding of this layman, an argument is question-begging if it takes a contestable premise (stated or unstated) for granted. What you're describing sounds more like what's commonly known as a "circular" argument: one in which the conclusion merely restates a premise in different terms.