Love this (and your articles in general). Often brought this up with my EA friends when discussing vegetarianism and utilitarianism. Like even Tolstoy was a vegetarian, and he def wasn't a utilitarian.
i generally agree, tho think the idea could've been presented way more simply, without a bunch of fancy logic and terminology, for example:
"utilitarianism is controversial because sometimes the optimal way to help people is to things that seem unkind/psychopathic/too cold and calculating (and there are easy strawmen standing around, like, 'if youre a utilitarian why dont you think hospitals should steal patients' organs and redistribute?'. but the core is is just, 'you should try to help people'."
a related thought:
"you should try to help people and make the world a better place", is a disturbingly rare and controversial opinion.
so rare that you can expect people to claim you're lying or exaggerating for "social points", when you make such a statement
Disclaimer: I haven't read Animal Liberation Now, only the original, years ago and years before I went vegan.
Depending upon which of Singer's specific claims about animals, factory farming and human motivation in consuming animal products he's claiming to be mostly independent of utilitarianism, I can see her being right.
For example, it seems prima facie reasonable that a single chicken's capacities for positive and negative well-being matter at least somewhat less than a single (average) human's. For a utilitarian, it's still easy to derive the conclusion that what's happening to chickens is worse than all of the badness that's happening to humans. That's because the utilitarian accepts the additive property of well-being. But non-consequentialists often deny the additive property. Some claim that human well-being is lexically higher than non-human well-being; others claim that well-being of different individuals cannot be compared on a single scale.
Of course, it would've been helpful if the review had pointed out the specific, allegedly utilitarianism-bound, claims that Singer was referring to.
In Animal Liberation, Singer bases his rejection of speciesism (as well as sexism and racism) on the equal consideration of interests principle. This is the principle of preference utilitarianism. Singer even introduces it by citing two utilitarian philosophers as offering some kind of formulation of it:
"Jeremy Bentham, the founder of the reforming utilitarian school of moral philosophy, incorporated the essential basis of moral equality into his system of ethics by means of the formula: 'Each to count for one and none for more than one.' In other words, the interests of every being affected by an action are to be taken into account and given the same weight as the like interests of any other being. A later utilitarian, Henry Sidgwick, put the point in this way: 'The good of any one individual is of no more importance, from the point of view (if I may say so) of the Universe, than the good of any other.' More recently the leading figures in contemporary moral philosophy [such as R.M. Hare, presumably] have shown a great deal of agreement in specifying as a fundamental presupposition of their moral theories some similar requirement that works to give everyone’s interests equal consideration—although these writers generally cannot agree on how this requirement is best formulated."
In "Utilitarianism and Vegetarianism" (1980), Singer is explicit that the equal consideration of interests principle, and thus his argument against specieism, is utilitarian. He opens the essay with this: "I am a utilitarian. I am also a vegetarian. I am a vegetarian because I am a utilitarian. I believe that applying the principle of utility to our present situation—especially the methods now used to rear animals for food and the variety of food available to us—leads to the conclusion that we ought to be vegetarian."
Later in the essay, he links utilitarianism with the equal consideration of interests principle:
"The only principle of equality I hold is the principle that the interests of every being affected by an action are to be taken into account and given the same weight as the like interests of any other being—what Regan calls the 'equality of interests' principle. As Regan grants, utilitarianism presupposes this principle. The principle of equality of interests merely makes it explicit that, because the principle of utility is the sole basis of morality, no other principle will limit the application of the principle of utility, or affect the way in which it operates" (328–329).
"His arguments often look like utilitarian arguments; they are certainly not, for example, religious or Kantian ones." Odd to hear people refer to "Kantian arguments". Is there such a thing? I was under the impression that there's not.
Maybe there's a more serious element in the Kantian tradition that I've missed (allowing for John Roemer as one exception), but otherwise, I wonder if it'd be best for philosophers to simply leave behind reference "Kantian" anything and just talk about more specific ideas/arguments like the two mentioned in your conclusion or others.
I like to poke people in the eye for no reason because claims that one shouldn't assume a controversial utilitarianism.
Even Kantians accept or ought to accept a wide duty to promote other people's well being.
Love this (and your articles in general). Often brought this up with my EA friends when discussing vegetarianism and utilitarianism. Like even Tolstoy was a vegetarian, and he def wasn't a utilitarian.
Quite helpful, thanks!
about the article:
i generally agree, tho think the idea could've been presented way more simply, without a bunch of fancy logic and terminology, for example:
"utilitarianism is controversial because sometimes the optimal way to help people is to things that seem unkind/psychopathic/too cold and calculating (and there are easy strawmen standing around, like, 'if youre a utilitarian why dont you think hospitals should steal patients' organs and redistribute?'. but the core is is just, 'you should try to help people'."
a related thought:
"you should try to help people and make the world a better place", is a disturbingly rare and controversial opinion.
so rare that you can expect people to claim you're lying or exaggerating for "social points", when you make such a statement
Disclaimer: I haven't read Animal Liberation Now, only the original, years ago and years before I went vegan.
Depending upon which of Singer's specific claims about animals, factory farming and human motivation in consuming animal products he's claiming to be mostly independent of utilitarianism, I can see her being right.
For example, it seems prima facie reasonable that a single chicken's capacities for positive and negative well-being matter at least somewhat less than a single (average) human's. For a utilitarian, it's still easy to derive the conclusion that what's happening to chickens is worse than all of the badness that's happening to humans. That's because the utilitarian accepts the additive property of well-being. But non-consequentialists often deny the additive property. Some claim that human well-being is lexically higher than non-human well-being; others claim that well-being of different individuals cannot be compared on a single scale.
Of course, it would've been helpful if the review had pointed out the specific, allegedly utilitarianism-bound, claims that Singer was referring to.
In Animal Liberation, Singer bases his rejection of speciesism (as well as sexism and racism) on the equal consideration of interests principle. This is the principle of preference utilitarianism. Singer even introduces it by citing two utilitarian philosophers as offering some kind of formulation of it:
"Jeremy Bentham, the founder of the reforming utilitarian school of moral philosophy, incorporated the essential basis of moral equality into his system of ethics by means of the formula: 'Each to count for one and none for more than one.' In other words, the interests of every being affected by an action are to be taken into account and given the same weight as the like interests of any other being. A later utilitarian, Henry Sidgwick, put the point in this way: 'The good of any one individual is of no more importance, from the point of view (if I may say so) of the Universe, than the good of any other.' More recently the leading figures in contemporary moral philosophy [such as R.M. Hare, presumably] have shown a great deal of agreement in specifying as a fundamental presupposition of their moral theories some similar requirement that works to give everyone’s interests equal consideration—although these writers generally cannot agree on how this requirement is best formulated."
In "Utilitarianism and Vegetarianism" (1980), Singer is explicit that the equal consideration of interests principle, and thus his argument against specieism, is utilitarian. He opens the essay with this: "I am a utilitarian. I am also a vegetarian. I am a vegetarian because I am a utilitarian. I believe that applying the principle of utility to our present situation—especially the methods now used to rear animals for food and the variety of food available to us—leads to the conclusion that we ought to be vegetarian."
Later in the essay, he links utilitarianism with the equal consideration of interests principle:
"The only principle of equality I hold is the principle that the interests of every being affected by an action are to be taken into account and given the same weight as the like interests of any other being—what Regan calls the 'equality of interests' principle. As Regan grants, utilitarianism presupposes this principle. The principle of equality of interests merely makes it explicit that, because the principle of utility is the sole basis of morality, no other principle will limit the application of the principle of utility, or affect the way in which it operates" (328–329).
"His arguments often look like utilitarian arguments; they are certainly not, for example, religious or Kantian ones." Odd to hear people refer to "Kantian arguments". Is there such a thing? I was under the impression that there's not.
Maybe there's a more serious element in the Kantian tradition that I've missed (allowing for John Roemer as one exception), but otherwise, I wonder if it'd be best for philosophers to simply leave behind reference "Kantian" anything and just talk about more specific ideas/arguments like the two mentioned in your conclusion or others.