I know this is not the main point here, but I would really question the idea that people tithed 10% "without complaint". Tithes were often more like taxes than voluntary donations, and there were revolts against them, e.g.: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539720
I'm wondering how much overlap there is between apparent examples of reactive ethics and apparent examples of "expanding circle" moral weighting of others based upon metaphorical proximity to oneself. When people put a lot of effort into domestic political causes, it usually doesn't strike me as particularly reactive, but more like proactive altruism toward their respective political tribe first, their own nation second (possibly also including a few other select "similar" nations), and the faraway rest of the world mostly out of the calculation.
I guess one of the main reasons why EA is commonly conflated with Utilitarianism is because it seems like the EA movement itself constantly explictly or implictly assumes Utilitarianism to be correct - let's take MacAskill's new book: He doesn't just say that affecting the future is very important, but goes much farther (i.e. strong longtermism) by appealing to utilitarian principles. Of course a deontologist will be put off by this.
“The positive case for goal-directedness is trivial: as a general rule, you’re more likely to do better if you at least try.”
Either I don’t understand your distinction between goal directed morality and reactive morality, or ... yeah, I don’t understand it. Maybe you mean that constraints and duties don’t cover all of morality; that we also should or could have moral goals in addition to or instead of duties and obligations.
A moral goal presumably improves the world generally, as distinct from improving it only for the acting agent. It is a moral opportunity, as distinct from a moral obligation. Is there a reason to think goal direction and reaction are mutually exclusive, or antagonistic, as opposed to complementary?
I’m tempted to think reactive morality is morality with the goal of avoiding making things worse on a local level. The people around me don’t expect me to defect in our various social games. If I did, that would have an immediate negative effect on trust and cooperation, which are fundamental to social progress. If I won’t help others, I should at least not get in their way.
I suspect that this attempt to view reactive morality as a goal-oriented category misses your point somehow.
I know this is not the main point here, but I would really question the idea that people tithed 10% "without complaint". Tithes were often more like taxes than voluntary donations, and there were revolts against them, e.g.: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539720
I'm wondering how much overlap there is between apparent examples of reactive ethics and apparent examples of "expanding circle" moral weighting of others based upon metaphorical proximity to oneself. When people put a lot of effort into domestic political causes, it usually doesn't strike me as particularly reactive, but more like proactive altruism toward their respective political tribe first, their own nation second (possibly also including a few other select "similar" nations), and the faraway rest of the world mostly out of the calculation.
Your claim that goal-directedness is rare in "non-consequentialist" moral thought seems unfounded.
Take, for instance, Kant --common target of consequentialists-- and his doctrine of morally obligatory ends.
I guess one of the main reasons why EA is commonly conflated with Utilitarianism is because it seems like the EA movement itself constantly explictly or implictly assumes Utilitarianism to be correct - let's take MacAskill's new book: He doesn't just say that affecting the future is very important, but goes much farther (i.e. strong longtermism) by appealing to utilitarian principles. Of course a deontologist will be put off by this.
“The positive case for goal-directedness is trivial: as a general rule, you’re more likely to do better if you at least try.”
Either I don’t understand your distinction between goal directed morality and reactive morality, or ... yeah, I don’t understand it. Maybe you mean that constraints and duties don’t cover all of morality; that we also should or could have moral goals in addition to or instead of duties and obligations.
A moral goal presumably improves the world generally, as distinct from improving it only for the acting agent. It is a moral opportunity, as distinct from a moral obligation. Is there a reason to think goal direction and reaction are mutually exclusive, or antagonistic, as opposed to complementary?
I’m tempted to think reactive morality is morality with the goal of avoiding making things worse on a local level. The people around me don’t expect me to defect in our various social games. If I did, that would have an immediate negative effect on trust and cooperation, which are fundamental to social progress. If I won’t help others, I should at least not get in their way.
I suspect that this attempt to view reactive morality as a goal-oriented category misses your point somehow.