It seems like there are useful analogies to the blameworthiness/blamability distinction in several nonmoral domains. For instance, a human move in a strategy game can simultaneously have a clear theoretical status as a "bad move", and also be the move an omniscient observer aligned with the agent would recommend, knowing the subsequent game-losing error it would cause the opponent to make. Relative to the same goal (winning the game -- or maximizing winning chances), these are two highly related but separable notions of instrumental goodness.
Fascinating discussion. I think I'm still a bit puzzled about how a utilitarian can adopt a "fittingness" account of blameworthiness. You rightly see (and accept) that this implies that someone who kills the innocent person with the right utilitarian motive in the trolley case is not blameworthy (though possibly "blame-able"). The other direction may be more troubling: Won't every act that I perform with a motive that is out of harmony with utilitarianism--for example, acts that benefit my friends and loved ones, done from a motive of caring about them more--be blameworthy (though perhaps not blame-able) on this view?
If all such acts from non-utilitarian motives are blameworthy, how will a virtuous utilitarian agent relate to this fact? The agent, on the one hand, will see that she is blameworthy, say, when she acts out of love for her child; but she may also see that it is morally right for her to cultivate in herself the tendency to act exactly that way, from exactly that motive, in that situation. So she doesn't feel any moral guilt, nor does she think that she should; but she still sees that she is blameworthy? I see what this "blameworthiness" points to--namely, the way in which her partial motive is inaccurate or incorrect in its basic relation to the impartial good--but I'm not sure it seems like the right term to capture that incongruity.
I'm a bit unclear on why we need the internal and/or intrinsic conceptions of rationality and goodness. It does seem clear that we have an intuitive conception of these sorts of things, and I can see why it might be consequentially good for us to have such intuitions. But I'm not sure why the theory needs to have a role for this kind of "fittingness" (I'm generally suspicious of any truth to "fittingness" judgments of any kind, though I suspect these judgments are often the result of dispositions that are good ones to have).
According to love consequentialism, we should not want Bob to "make the mistake," in this heinous scenario you've concocted which has really dark implications for the real world, we should *mourn the loss of the puppies* for that plays a role in their continued existence or, if you don't believe in that, it shows love for the puppies and so warms the heart of their loved ones. To "want Bob to make the mistake" is to be engaged in the scenario as a dark spectator at a demonic ball game "Do it, Bob! For the Puppies!" What *human beings* do in such a scenario is *look away* because when they are powerless to help, they do not want their memories of their loved ones to be fucked with by horrific images, and then -- again -- they *mourn the loss of innocent life* in part by seeking to enact just retribution on behalf of the puppies during their lifetime, with the end goal of eradicating in totality perverse demons, bobs, and their utterly *perturbing* spectators. See how love by itself brings about the best consequences?
This is all a bit outside my expertise, but I thought virtues were dispositions to be moved to do what you have reasons to do. If so, doesn't consequentialism entail that the only virtue is the disposition to maximize welfare (or whatever)? Then there's no conflict between acting rightly and being virtuous, just a revisionism about virtue.
This reads to me like an "ends can justify un-virtuous means" argument? So although it's blameworthy to torture the terrorist who has the code to stop the bomb going off that will kill thousands, it's still the correct thing to do on the other dimension?
Glad to see you biting the bullet, and look forward to analyzing the teeth marks!
The goal is to stop bad people from using good theory to justify bad actions. I don’t know how you’ll could do it with consequentialism, but if anyone can, it’s you!
It seems like there are useful analogies to the blameworthiness/blamability distinction in several nonmoral domains. For instance, a human move in a strategy game can simultaneously have a clear theoretical status as a "bad move", and also be the move an omniscient observer aligned with the agent would recommend, knowing the subsequent game-losing error it would cause the opponent to make. Relative to the same goal (winning the game -- or maximizing winning chances), these are two highly related but separable notions of instrumental goodness.
Fascinating discussion. I think I'm still a bit puzzled about how a utilitarian can adopt a "fittingness" account of blameworthiness. You rightly see (and accept) that this implies that someone who kills the innocent person with the right utilitarian motive in the trolley case is not blameworthy (though possibly "blame-able"). The other direction may be more troubling: Won't every act that I perform with a motive that is out of harmony with utilitarianism--for example, acts that benefit my friends and loved ones, done from a motive of caring about them more--be blameworthy (though perhaps not blame-able) on this view?
If all such acts from non-utilitarian motives are blameworthy, how will a virtuous utilitarian agent relate to this fact? The agent, on the one hand, will see that she is blameworthy, say, when she acts out of love for her child; but she may also see that it is morally right for her to cultivate in herself the tendency to act exactly that way, from exactly that motive, in that situation. So she doesn't feel any moral guilt, nor does she think that she should; but she still sees that she is blameworthy? I see what this "blameworthiness" points to--namely, the way in which her partial motive is inaccurate or incorrect in its basic relation to the impartial good--but I'm not sure it seems like the right term to capture that incongruity.
I'm a bit unclear on why we need the internal and/or intrinsic conceptions of rationality and goodness. It does seem clear that we have an intuitive conception of these sorts of things, and I can see why it might be consequentially good for us to have such intuitions. But I'm not sure why the theory needs to have a role for this kind of "fittingness" (I'm generally suspicious of any truth to "fittingness" judgments of any kind, though I suspect these judgments are often the result of dispositions that are good ones to have).
According to love consequentialism, we should not want Bob to "make the mistake," in this heinous scenario you've concocted which has really dark implications for the real world, we should *mourn the loss of the puppies* for that plays a role in their continued existence or, if you don't believe in that, it shows love for the puppies and so warms the heart of their loved ones. To "want Bob to make the mistake" is to be engaged in the scenario as a dark spectator at a demonic ball game "Do it, Bob! For the Puppies!" What *human beings* do in such a scenario is *look away* because when they are powerless to help, they do not want their memories of their loved ones to be fucked with by horrific images, and then -- again -- they *mourn the loss of innocent life* in part by seeking to enact just retribution on behalf of the puppies during their lifetime, with the end goal of eradicating in totality perverse demons, bobs, and their utterly *perturbing* spectators. See how love by itself brings about the best consequences?
This is all a bit outside my expertise, but I thought virtues were dispositions to be moved to do what you have reasons to do. If so, doesn't consequentialism entail that the only virtue is the disposition to maximize welfare (or whatever)? Then there's no conflict between acting rightly and being virtuous, just a revisionism about virtue.
This reads to me like an "ends can justify un-virtuous means" argument? So although it's blameworthy to torture the terrorist who has the code to stop the bomb going off that will kill thousands, it's still the correct thing to do on the other dimension?
So what does blameworthy mean if you reject the notion that it means expedient to blame?
Glad to see you biting the bullet, and look forward to analyzing the teeth marks!
The goal is to stop bad people from using good theory to justify bad actions. I don’t know how you’ll could do it with consequentialism, but if anyone can, it’s you!