I don't see why the idea of moral prohibition is "semi-mystical," much more than the concept of "moral reason." I don't think social-standing considerations or emotional reactions are inherent in the idea of moral prohibitions on behavior. The idea of a moral obligation to always do the optimal behavior seems excessively demanding. I suppose if we reject the idea of obligation and supererogation, then we don't have this counterintuitive conclusion, but those seem like real things to me and most people. For most utilitarians, it would seem, flipping the switch is a moral obligation, not merely the thing we have most moral reason to do. Most say "you SHOULD flip the switch." Your perspective seems a bit unique from my general impression, but you are obviously more familiar with this than me.
"It’s OK to be flawed—everyone else is too. We can all celebrate incremental improvements, and uphold norms to prevent moral backsliding (you should feel terrible, and suffer criminal punishment, if you gratuitously murder someone!)."
Most people treat murder and letting die as incredibly different from a moral perspective, but one feature of utilitarianism is that they are equally morally bad if the consequences are equal. This is also counter-intuitive for most. I don't understand why utilitarians shouldn't harshly condemn not donating to GiveWell and maybe even criminally punish people who do not if we treat these things as morally equivalent. Many people who donate to GiveWell seem to feel guilt that they don't give more; seems like we should be harshly condemning them instead of trying to assuage their guilt. People who only give 10% when they could give more are morally worse than most poor murderers.
“ . We just think you have most moral reason to do the optimal thing, that’s all. Far from being “crazy”, this claim is nearly trivial—who would deny it?”
If utilitarianism means that what is moral is what is optimal, this is circular reasoning. What distinguishes moral reason from other sorts?
If utilitarianism simply ranks things, and does not compel one to choose the higher ranked thing, that would mean that moral reasons don’t always overrule other sorts of reasons. But this then makes it ambiguous what one ought to do, or by what metastandard one should decide.
I don't see why the idea of moral prohibition is "semi-mystical," much more than the concept of "moral reason." I don't think social-standing considerations or emotional reactions are inherent in the idea of moral prohibitions on behavior. The idea of a moral obligation to always do the optimal behavior seems excessively demanding. I suppose if we reject the idea of obligation and supererogation, then we don't have this counterintuitive conclusion, but those seem like real things to me and most people. For most utilitarians, it would seem, flipping the switch is a moral obligation, not merely the thing we have most moral reason to do. Most say "you SHOULD flip the switch." Your perspective seems a bit unique from my general impression, but you are obviously more familiar with this than me.
"It’s OK to be flawed—everyone else is too. We can all celebrate incremental improvements, and uphold norms to prevent moral backsliding (you should feel terrible, and suffer criminal punishment, if you gratuitously murder someone!)."
Most people treat murder and letting die as incredibly different from a moral perspective, but one feature of utilitarianism is that they are equally morally bad if the consequences are equal. This is also counter-intuitive for most. I don't understand why utilitarians shouldn't harshly condemn not donating to GiveWell and maybe even criminally punish people who do not if we treat these things as morally equivalent. Many people who donate to GiveWell seem to feel guilt that they don't give more; seems like we should be harshly condemning them instead of trying to assuage their guilt. People who only give 10% when they could give more are morally worse than most poor murderers.
“ . We just think you have most moral reason to do the optimal thing, that’s all. Far from being “crazy”, this claim is nearly trivial—who would deny it?”
If utilitarianism means that what is moral is what is optimal, this is circular reasoning. What distinguishes moral reason from other sorts?
If utilitarianism simply ranks things, and does not compel one to choose the higher ranked thing, that would mean that moral reasons don’t always overrule other sorts of reasons. But this then makes it ambiguous what one ought to do, or by what metastandard one should decide.
People already covered all these exact points 150 years ago, by the way -- specifically Mill, in his book Utilitarianism, responding to detractors.